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The purpose of thisl~s to examine the development of State practice, conventions, judicial 
decisions, arbitral ~;s and settlements on the delimitation of maritime boundaries in a 
European and Mediterranean context. 
Conclusions will be expressed on important principles which may be of relevance in future 
























OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 
IN EUROPE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE 
TO THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA 
PARTI 
INTRODUCTION 
SOURCES OF THE LAW OF MARITIME DELIMITATION 
The law of maritime delimitatio,n is fairly new. Just over thirty years ago it did no more than 
· merely place States under and obligation to delimit their maritime zones and boundaries and, if 
necessary, enter into negotiations in order to do so, by means of agreement with a view to 
reaching an equitable solution! . In the field of maritime delimitation the primary source of law 
has been judgments and arbitrations. Thus, today, the law is "essentially judge-made law"2. 
There have been two multilateral treaties which deal with the law on delimitation of the continental 
shelf: The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958 (hereinafter, the Geneva 
Convention) and the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982 (hereinafter, LOSC). However, in the 
words of Weil, "Although this body of treaty provisions ... may seem impressive, it has to be 
recognized that its contribution to the law of maritime delimitation has been relatively modest" 3 . 
The 1958 provision regarding delimitation was given minimal effect by the ICJ and arbitration 
tribunals. This prevented it from playing the "dynamic and creative role it might have"4. The 
provisions on delimitation in the 1982 convention are notoriously vague and imprecise, and have 
been subject to much criticism. In essence, they consist of a general reference to already existing 
rules of international law, and therefore require detailed analysis of the law as it stands in order to 
determine what these rules ares. No precise rule is stated in the Convention. Thus, these 
provisions, dissappointingly, must be given the status of a set of general guidelines and principles. 
States are free to draw up their own boundaries by agreement without being bound by the set of 
rules which would bind a judge or arbitrator, although in practice States do at least attempt to base 
their claims on the law and employ legal arguments to back their claim. In a relatively short 
space of time the ICJ has dealt extensively with the law of maritime delimitation - some of the 
1 P. Weil, The Law of Maritine Delimitation - Reflections, 1989, p. 6. Refers to the law prior to the Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958 
2 ibid, p.6 
3 ibid, p. 7 
4 ibid 
5 See E.D. Brown, International Law of the Sea, Volume I , 1994, p. 160 
He contintues to say that such an inquiry into the present state of the law reveals the "sometimes 
vague and uncertain, sometimes unsatisfactory nature of the judgments and awards so far given by 























more important cases which will be examined below are· the North Sea cases (1969)6. the 
Tunisia/Libya Judgment(l 982)7 , the Malta/Libya judgment (1985)8 , as well as in the Anglo-
French Arbitration (1977-1978)9. 
Although prima facie the case law may appear to have developed incrementally by analagous 
references to previous cases, this view overlooks the frequently contradictory judgments. For 
example, what is meant by equity and equitable principles in one judgment is not consistent with 
the next, although the shift in meaning is obscured by the fact that the judge cites the view in the 
previous decision approving1y10. Contradictions and inconsistencies have even been know to 
I 
occur in the same judgmentl 1. 
The law of maritime delimitation has been descibed as 11 a discontinuous ensemble, in which 
various principles and rules of law coexist, with no hierarchy between them, and without its 
always being possible to determine their mutual relations with precision ... ". and a " ... loosely 
woven fabric" 12. This makes it difficult to describe the law systematically as· every question and 
every· problem involves further questions and problemsl3. 
Other difficulties are caused by the fact that although the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982 
(LOSC) has come into force (1994) and more than half of the States have become parties to it, 
there are still some States which are parties to the Geneva Convention, 1958, and have not yet 
ratified LOSC. They are still bound only by the Geneva Convention. Thus it is necessary to 
consider both the "old" law and the new. Also, a substantial amount of difficulty is caused by the 
delimitation provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention which are vague and poorly drafted. 
E.D .. Brown describes the rules as consisting both largely of "a general reference to the 
applicable rules of international law "14 , therefore requiring a thorough investigation into what 
the current state of the law of maritime delimitation which, unfortunately, is also somewhat vague 
and indefinite, and not without an element of ambiguity as a result of the unsatisfactory nature of 
some of the judgments and awards given. 
A degree of inadequacy in the law has been the natural result of attempting to strike a balance 
between two conflicting requirements; the first, to define rules which are general enough to cover 
all possible situations which may arise, and the second, to ensure that the rule is not so general that 
in some cases it may lead to an unpredictable or inequitable result. This in itself is a latent 
contradiction. The courts have seized "equity" as their solution to ensuring the correct balance. 
But this concept they have repeatedly refused to define. 
6 The North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Denmark/Germany; Netherlands/Gem1any), (lCJ - 1969) 
7 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya),(lCJ - 1951) 
8 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), (ICJ .- 1985) 
9 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case (Court of Arbitration - 1987-88) 
10 Weil, supra, p.10 refers to "great gulf between the theory of one judgment and that of another " 
11 ibid, p.11 
12 ibid, p. 11 
13 Judges Ruda, Bedjauoi and Jimenez de Arechaga, in the Libya/Malta judment, supra, p. 90, para 37 





















In the law of delimitation, in many respects, "the conceptual framework remains fragile and 
uncertain, and the concrete solution adopted have not always been convincing" 15 - Since the law 
in this field is not yet complete it is an interesting topic on which to comment. 
HISTORY 
The Truman Proclamation of 1945 and State practice which ensued over the next six years 
provided the basis for the development of rules governing delimitation. The Truman 
Proclamation provided that: 
"In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of another State, or is shared with 
an adjacent State, the boundary shall be determined by the United States and the State 
concerned in accordance with equitable principles" 
and that 
"the continental shelf may be regarded as an extension Jo the land-mass of the coastal nation 
and thus naturally appurtenant to if'16_ 
Subsequent to this provisions made for delimitation by the majority of States included references 
to "equitable principles" and agreement with other states. 
However, development in the ensuing five to six years was just a "starting point" 11 As Lord 
Asquith stated in 1951, "/ am of the opinion ... that in no form can the doctrine claim as yet to 
have assumed hitherto the hard lineaments or the definitive status of an established rule of 
international law" 1s. 
However, significant progress was made between 1950 and 1956 during which time the 
International Law Commission (ILC) considered the law on continental shelf delimitation, 
building on the basic structure which existed at the time. Its formulation of draft articles on the 
continental shelf was adopted by UNCLOS I in the form of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention 
of 1958. 
15 Weil, supra, p. 12 
16 Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, in United Nations, Laws and Regulations on the Regime of 
the High Seas, Vol. I ( United Nations Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.Bl!, 11 January 1951, 
, pp38 - 40, Vol. II, doc. 7.3) 
17 Brown terms this period of five year a "starting point", ibid, p. 161 
























THE RULE IN THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 1958 
Article 6 and special circumstances 
· It has been suggested that the reason why the rule in Article 6 has often ·been misunderstood lies 
in the way it has been drafted I 9 and the fact that a literal interpretation may invite 
misunderstanding of the provision as a whole. In fact, in its judgment in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf case (1969) the ICJ interprets a hierarchical order20 into the linguistic 
construction of Article 6 which causes the proper meaning .of the clause to be overlooked. 
However, recourse to the travaux preparatoires provides a full account of the meaning of the 
Article and the intention of the drafters21. 
Article 6 provides that in the case of opposite and adjacent States, the boundary must be 
determined by agreement between the two States. In the absence of agreement and unless 
another boundary is justified by special circumstances, the boundary in the case of opposite 
States is a median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured. In the case of adjacent 
States the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the 
nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is 
measured. 
The inclusion of the term "special circumstances" was opposed by three States - Greece, Portugal 
and Yugoslavia - although most delegations supported it. The objective referred to in the Report 
of a Committee of Experts22 was the attain~ent of an 'equitable solution'23 . The term cannot 
cover a closed list of circumstances24. Its purpose, evident from the drafting history of Article 6, 
is to give "elasticity"25 to the general rule of equidistance in cases where departure from it is 
necessitated by certain conditions such as any exceptional configuration of the coast, the presence 
of islands or of navigable channels26. One comment - an opinion shared by others27 - was that 
"the International Law Commission's text was sufficiently flexible to provide all States whatever 
their geographical situation with the necessary safeguard"28. 
The main category of special circumstances is exceptional geographical circumstances, although 
14 F. A. Ahnish, The International Law of Maritime Boundaries and the Practice of States in the Mediterranean Sea, 
1992, P· 53. For example, the wording in the Article could be taken to infer that 'equidistance' must be 
considered as a secondary solution to the primary obligation to effecting delimitations by agree- ment 
20 Ahnish, supra, p. 53. "Article 6 is so framed as to put second the obligation to make use of the equidistance method, 
causing it to come after a primary obligation to effect delimitation by agreement" 
21 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, art. 32, provides that when a literal interpretation of the 
terms of a treaty leads to ambiguity or a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result, recourse may be had to the 
preparatory work of the treaty 
22 The Committee was set up to advise the ILC in its session of 1953 
23 Ahnish, supra, p. 56 
24 Brown, supra, p. 163 
25 See comments by members of the Commission, Yearbook of the /LC (1953), ii. 213, at 216 
26 ILC's Commentary on its penultimate, 1953 draft on article 6, quoted in Brown, supra, p. 162 
27 UNCLOS I, Official Records, vi. 92 - 96, statements by delegates of France, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Sweden and Italy 























there may be other considerations such as valuable mineral deposits or possession of mineral 
rights, navigation and fishing rights and special circumstances of an historical nature. As stated in 
the pleadings (of Denmark-Netherlands) in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, special . 
circumstances are only to be considered when they justify another boundary line. Thus, "only if 
deviation from the equidistance line is justified towards both States - i.e. the State which 'gains' 
and the State which 'loses' by the correction " can the principle of equidistance be departed 
from29. 
29 Brown, supra, p.163, quoting the Common Rejoiner, /CJ Peadings, North Sea Continental 























THE FORMATIVE ROLE OF DECISIONS AND AN EYALUA TION 
What will follow is an examination of two cases, the North Sea cases and the Anglo-French Award 
which conflict somewhat with article 6, mostly as a result of their different interpretations of 
'equidistance'. 
THE NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES (1969} 
Facts: 
Held: 
The cases concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf situated off the North Sea 
coasts of the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, and The Netherlands. The coast-
line of Germany in the North Sea lies at a concave angle of about 100 degrees. The ICJ 
was asked to identify the principles and rules of international law applicable to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf between the parties. 
Denmark and The Netherlands contended that the delimitation should be governed by 
Article 6. As there were no special circumstances their boundary with Germany should be 
determined by the principle of equidistance. 
The Federal Republic of Germany contended that equidistance should not be applied in 
this case because Germany was not a party to the Geneva Convention 30, Article 6 was not 
yet part of customary international law, and in any case should not be applied in situations 
where an inequitable result would occur. Further, even if Article 6 had become customary 
law, the existence of special circumstances in the North Sea would preclude its 
application3t. 
Equidistance was not obligatory, particularly as in certain geographical circumstances, such as a 
concave or convex coastline, when even "the slightest irregularity in a coastline is automatically 
magnified by the equidistance line... 32" the equidistance method leads unquestionable to 
inequity. It appears that the Court was overly concerned with equidistance in isolation without 
attempting to establish whether application of the 'special circumstance' rule would remedy the 
resulting inequity 33. Thus, the Court failed to utilize the inbuilt flexibility or "elasticity" inherent 
in Article 6 (as referred to above). 
Further, although the Court expressed doubts as to the appropriate role to be "played by the 
notion of special circumstances" and to "the exact meaning and scope " thereof, it appears that 
the relevant factors it cited to be taken into account during negotiations consisted of what could 
be considered to be 'special circumstances' under Article 634 . These included the general 
configuration of the coast-line and presence of special or unusual freatures, physical and 
30 Germany had not ratified the treaty and therefore was not bound by it 
31 The special circumstances were Germany"s concave or recessing coast 
32 Submissions (No. 3) of the Federal Republic of Germany 
33 Ahnish, supra, p. 59 






















geological structure and natural resources of the continental shelf and a reasonable degree of 
proportionality35 . 
In one respect the Court does give useful guidance in the interpretation of the rule in Article 6: 
Delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking 
into account relevant circumstances, "in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each Party 
all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory 
into and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of 
the other36". In dealing with the meaning of equity, the Court pointed out that there is no legal 
limit to considerations which may be taken into account in ensuring that equitable principles are 
applied, and that a variety of features must be balanced, such as geological factors relating to the 
shelf37, geographical configuration38, unity of deposits, a degree of proportionality between the 
extent of the continental shelf appurtenant to the States concerned and the length of their 
respective coast-lines39 . It is submitted that this could be taken to imply that equitable factors 
which could justify a boundary (apart from a true equidistance line) under international 
customary law are the same as the factors which would constitute special circumstances under 
Article 6 if given a broader construction. 
Further on the meaning of equity, the Court stated these requirements: 
• the existence of an obligation to enter into meaning ful negotiations with a view to 
arriving at an agreement; 
• an obligation to act in such a way that equitable principles are applied, using equidistance 
(although other methods exist and may be utilized alone or combined with another 
method); _ 
• the continental shelf of a State must be the natural prolongation of its land territory and 
must not encroach upon what is t11e natural prolongation of the territory of another state40 
• Should inequity be the result of the application of equidistance in certain geographical 
circumstances such as concavity of the coast-line, then such consequences should be 
remedied or compensated for 1as far as possible ... 41 ; 
• Equity does not mean equality42. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that a State 
should not enjoy continental shelf rights significantly greater than its neighbouring States 
35 ibid 
36 ICJ Reports (1969), p. 53 
37 ibid, p.51, para. 95 
38 ibid, p.51, para. 96 
39 ibid, p.52, para. 98 
40 ICJ Reports (1969), p. 47 
41 ibid, p.49, para. 87 






















merely by virtue of the fact that its coast-line is convex and its neighbour's concave43. 
The Court's Decision Versus State Practice 
The North Sea judgment has been criticised somewhat for its "exclusive concern" with the 
Truman Proclamation44 which, although a landmark decision in regards to the concept of the 
continental shelf, is somewhat vague and not as relevant in relation to certain other 
considerations45. Concern was at the expense of identifying a unified rule of 'equidistance-
special circumstances' from travaux preparatoires which accorded with the intention of the 
drafters, and from actual State practice46. To quote Ahnish. "This approach might have proven 
ultimately to be more productive for future settlements and would indeed have helped the 
successive efforts, both in UNCLOS III and adjudication, to discern some positive rules on 
delimitation"47 Brown, too, agrees with this assertion48. 
THE ANGLO-FRENCH CONTINENTAL SHELF CASE 0977)49 
\ 
This was the second landmark decision in the development of the law of delimitation between 
neighbouring States. The Tribunal was asked to draw the continental shelf boundary between the 
United Kingdom and France in the English Channel. 
FACTS: 
Both parties had ratified the Geneva Convention, although France had made a number of 
reservations to Article 6 which the United Kingdom did not accept. The Court stated that this 
"would not make much practical difference"50 . It simply meant that some parts of the area in 
question would be governed by Article 6 and others by customary international law, which 
would amount to the same thing anyway. 
HELD: 
The United Kingdom argued that under Article 6 the burden of proof was on France to prove the 
existence of any special circumstances which would justify abandonment of the median line 
boundary. In other words the assertion is that the median line (or equidistance) is the general 
rule, and 'special circumstances' the exception. 
However, the Court held that "Article 6 ... does not formulate the equidistance principle and 
'special circumstances' as two separate rules", but rather "as a single rule, a combined 
equidistance-special circumstance rule". In doing so the Court abandons the element of 
43 ibid, p.50, para. 91 
44 Brown, supra, p. 168 
45 By 1969 the Truman Proclamation was not as relevant to the law of delimitation as were more _recent developments 
in State practice, the work of the ILC and of UNCLOS I following the Truman Proclamation 
46 Ahnish,supra, p. 63 
47 ibid 
48 Brown, supra, p. 168; see section headed "The Court's decision in the light of State practice: a regrettable 
judgment" 
49 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case (Court of Arbitration - 1977 - 1978), ILM 397 






















hierarchy, which was an erroneous interpretation in Article 6 in the North Sea judgment, and 
dispels the notion of any burden of proof in regard to the existence of special circutnstances.51 
Article 6's interpretation as a 'single rule' means that although questions of fact are to be 
accounted for, the question is actuaIIy one of law. The significance of this 'single rule' 
interpretation is that the relevance of special circumstances does not depend on a pre-existing 
claim to invoke special circumstances advanced by the interested State when ratifyng or acceding 
to the Convention. Also, an element of elasticity is introduced in the fact that Article 6 now allows 
the judge discretion to consider the geographical and other circumstances (lying within the rules 
of delimitation).52 
Certain principles examined by the Tribunal. These were as foIIows: 
Natural Prolongation 
The Tribunal supported the view expressed in the North Sea cases that a coastal State has an 
inherent right to the continental shelf which is a natural prolongation of its land territory, and that 
its continental shelf must be" ... the natural prolongation of its land territory and must not 
encroach upon what is the natural prolongation of the territory of another State"53 . However, it 
also emphasised that this was not a solution, but rather a statement of the problem54. Such a 
situation arises when the natural prolongation of the territories of both States constitutes the same 
single area of continental shelf. 
Natural Prolongation is not a relevant factor in delimiting boundaries on the continental shelf, 
unless "there is a major geological discontinuity running laterally seawards from the vicinity of 
the coastal terminus of the land boundary of adjacent States, or lying between the coasts of 
opposite States"55. 
'Special circumstances' and 'equitable principles' 
France had made a number of reservations to Article 6. According to the Arbitration, this simply 
meant that some parts of the area in question would be governed by Article 6 and others by 
international customary law, although Article 6 was applicable to the delimitation in principle. 
Having said this, though, the Arbitration referred to the customary law rules discussed in the North 
Sea judgment. These rules were applicable in defining the conditions for applying the 
equidistance-special circumstances rule which are not adequately defined in Article 656. It stated 
that: 
" ... the equidistance-special circumstances rule and the rules of customary law have the same 
object - the delimitation of the boundary in accordance with equitable principles. In the view 
of this Court, therefore, the rules of customary law are a relevant and even essential means 
51 Ahnish, supra, p. 64 - 65 
52 ibid 
53 Decision, para 79. Quoted by Brown, supra, p. 172 
54 ibid 
55 ibid. Quoted by Brown, supra, p. 173 






















both for interpreting and completing the provisions of Article 6"57_ 
The Arbitration found that there would be little practical difference between applying customary 
law rather than Article 6 - which was necessary in light of France's reservations - as it would lead 
to " ... much the same resulf'58. Thus, the view was taken that the two are almost the same, thereby 
departing from the view in the North Sea judgment where only a tenuous link was made between 
them. However, the statement was preceeded by the term " ... in the circumstances of this case" 59. 
Also, Brown submits that it proves nothing about the relationship between the rules of Article 6 
and the rules of international customary law6o . He considers that although 'special 
circumstances' under Article 6 would also constitute 'factors creative of inequity' under 
international customary law, the reverse is not necessarily true. Factors considered to be creative 
of inequity will not necessarily also fall within the definition of special circumstances under 
Article 661 . 
Further on in the award62 the requirements of 'equitable principles' under customary law and the 
effects of 'special circumstances' are considered to be "differences of approach and terminology 
rather than of substance "63. Once again, the statement must be considered to be incorrect as a 
general principle, although it may be reasonable when applied only to the circumstances of this 
case64. 
The Court found that the presence of the Channel Islands close to the French coast must be 
considered as a circumstance creative of inequity and a 'special circumstance' under Article 6. It 
then considered other 'relevant circumstances' and 'equitable considerations'. 
The Burden of Proof 
It was argued that under Article 6 the burden of proof was on France to prove the existence of 
any special circumstances which would justify abandonment of the median line boundary. Thus 
the assertion is that the median line (or equidistance line) is the general rule, and 'special 
circumstances' the exception to the rule65. This suggests that two separate rules could be applied -
one rule, one exception. 
The Tribunal did not accept this argument and doubted that there was any burden of proof here. 
It stated that "Article 6... does not formulate the equidistance principle and 'special 
circumstances' as two separate rules", but rather "as a single rule, a combined equidistance-
57 ibid 
58 Ahnish, supra, p.64 
59 ibid 
60 Brown, supra, p.174 
61 ibid 
62 Decision, para 148. Quoted by Brown, supra, p. 173 
63 ibid 
64ibid 























special circumstance rule"66 . The existence of special circumstances was an essential 
consideration when applying the equidistance principle. This question was always one of law of 
which the tribunal must itself, propio motu, take cognisance when applying Article 667 . . 
By interpreting Article 6 in this way the court rejects the existence of a hierarchy between the two 
parts of the rule and the notion of any burden of proof in regard to the existence of special 
circumstances68 . 
Ahnish submits that the significance of a 'single rule' interpretation is that the relevance of special 
circumstances does not depend on a pre-existing claim to invoke special circumstances advanced 
by the interested State when ratifyng the Convention. Also, an element of elasticity is introduced 
in the fact that Article 6 now allows the judge discretion to consider the geographical and other 
circumstances - lying within the rules of delimitation.69. 
Considerations taken into Account in Ensuring the Application of Equitable Principles 
The proposition that "there is no legal limit to the considerations which States may take into 
account of for the purpose of making sure that they apply equitable procedures ... " 10 - made by 
the ICJ in the North Sea cases - is somewhat misleading. Taken literally it could mean that there 
are limitless consideration which could constitute factors productive of inequity. 
In the Anglo-French Decision the Court pointed out that such considerations must lie "within the 
rules" of law71, thereby qualifying the ICJ's statement. The dictum was to be read in light of 
other observation of the ICJ in the same judgment72 and not in isolation; there was no question 
of a decision ex aequo et bono13 or of "completely refashioning nature"74. 
The Principle of Proportionality 
The Court gave proportionality less significance than it had been given in the North Sea cases. It 
held that the notion proportionality may be invoked in order to support the existence of special 
circumstances ~s a result of 'unjust distorting effects'75. 
Opposite and Adjacent States Distinguished 
France argued that Article 6 was not applicable because the situation was not one of either 
opposite States or adjacent States. The ICJ' s previous rigid differentiation between the two 
66 Decision, para 68 
67 ibid 
68 ibid. According to Brown, supra, p. 17 4, the Court's attitude to the burden of proof should be of some concern. He 
quotes Briggs' declaration appended to the Decision in support of this. 
69 Ahnish, supra, p. 65 
70 ICJ Reports 1969, para 98 
71 Brown, supra, p.17 4 
72 Ahnish, supra, p.69 
73 ICJ Reports 1969, supra, para 88 
74 ibid, para 91 























situations was used in support of this76. The Tribunal in the Anglo-French Decision held that 
every situation had to fall into either one of the two categories of Article 6; the States were either 
opposite or adjacent77 . 
The Tribunal's findings 
The Tribunal found that the Channel Island archipelago, being on the 'wrong side of the line'?&, 
was a special circumstance. It then declared a continental shelf of twelve miles for the Islands79 
The Tribunal held that the presence of islands - the Scillies - was a case of special circumstances. 
It took the special circumstance into consideration and departed from the median line. However, 
if the line were to be measured from the islands rather from the British mainland then there would 
be an inequitable distortion of the line which would produce a disproportionate share of shelf 
between the two Statesso. 
Thus the Scilly Islands were given 'half effect' in order to achieve an equitable solution. 
Conclusion 
• The Tribunal corrected some of the mistakes and reinterprets the dicta of the North Sea 
judgment. 
• The doctrine of natural prolongation is given the correct emphasis. 
• It restricts the use of proportionality and corrects the lack of limitation on the 
considerations which may be taken into account in ensuring the application of equitable 
principles. 
• The rigid interpretation of opposite and adjacent situations is rejected. 
• An attempt was made to clarify special circumstances, and the relationship between Article 
6 and rules of international customary law, but the value of this is questionable. Possibly 
the Tribunal was too simplistic in finding Article 6 and customary law to reflect of each 
other&I. Criticism has also been directed at the Tribunal's stance on the equidistance rule 
and the burden of proof of special circumstances82 
76 ICJ Reports 1969, para 36. The court had found that Denmark and the Netherlands were neither 
opposite nor adjacent States, and therefore it could not apply a delimitation. 
77 Decision, para 240 - 242 
78 Decision, para 159 
79 Which the U.K. could have obtained anyway by declaring a twelve-mile territorial sea around the 
Channel Islands 
80 Anglo-French decision, para 249 

























THE LAW UNDER 
THE 1982 
CONVENTION ON 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 
II 
During UNCLOS III the issue of maritime delimitation was a steadfast problem and was 
eventually referred to Negotiating Group 783. By this time opinion had already split into two 
main interest groups: The 'Equitable Principles Group', headed by Ireland, and the 
'Equidistance Group', headed by Spain84 . That no attempt to either question or solve the 
opposition between the groups has been seen as a major shortcoming" in the discussions of 
Group 7 85 Both groups had put forward their own main proposal 86. This resulted in conflict 
between the two groups throughout the negotiations of Group 7 and an inability to come to any 
agreement87 . 
However, finally, a compromise formula was agreed to in August 1981 at the Tenth Session of 
UNCLOS Ill, and Articles 74 and 83 were drawn up. This formula has been subject to much 
criticism, and whether consensus was achieved on the relevant text88. In fact, the 'hasty insertion 
in the draft convention was questioned publicly by many members of the Conference, such as the 
United States, China, Portugal, Iran, Egypt, Libya and Kuwait' 89 . Allott commented:, "could it 
be said to be anything but bizarre?"90 
Article 83 provides the following: 
1. The delimitation of the Continental Shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts 
shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable 
solution91 . 
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States concerned 
83 Group 7 was one of a number of groups appointed by the 1978 Session of the Conference to deal 
with outstanding hard-core problems. See Ahnish, supra, p. 72 




88 ibid, p. 75. 
89 B. Oxman, 'The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth Session (1981)' 76 AJIL (1982), 
at p.s 14 - 15 
90 P.Allott, 'Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea', 77 AJIL (1983) 1 at 20) 























shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV. 
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of 
understanding and co-operation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardise or 
hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such agreements shall be without prejudice 
to the final delimitation. 
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions relating to 
the delimitation of the continental shelf shall be determined in accordance with the 
provisions of that agreement. 
It is paragraph 1 which contains the compromise formula. According to Brown, the result is that 
"the international community is now saddled with a formula which is all that a legal rule should 
not be - excessively vague and imprecise and drafted by reference to even more vague and 
controversial concepts"92, and the formula is no more than an "empty shell"93 . 
ARTICLE 83{1} - AN INTERPRETATION 
Conference records are not helpful in establishing the meaning of the new formula. The reason 
for this94 is probably that interpretation of the text at the time was stifled as it was thought that 
such an attempt might "undermine what had been achieved after difficult negotiations"95. 
Clearly, the basis of this 'extremely general'96 formula was considered to be extremely fragile. 
The Principle of Agreement: 
Under the Convention delimitation shall be effected by agreement. This formulation is heavily 
influenced by the North Sea cases in which it was held that "delimitation must be the subject of 
agreement between the States concernecf'97. 
Such agreement must be 'on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice'. The intention of this reference appears to be to 
limit agreements to the criteria prescribed by international law. 
The obligation to reach an agreement on the basis of Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ is similar 
in scope to that obligation under international customary law98, as identified by the ICJ in the 
92 Brown, supra, p. 157 
93 ibid, p. 160 
94 ibid 
95 ibid. Brown quotes the President's appeal to delegations to avoid making interpretative statements 
for this reason. (154th Plenary Meeting, 28 August 1981, UNCLOS lII Official Records, Vol. XV, 
1983,p.40 
96 ibid. p. 158 
























North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969). The Court held that parties· were under an obligation 
to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement99 . In other words it was not 
simply a matter of going through the motions of negotiation which would then be followed by 
the application of a certain method of delimitation in the absence of agreement - negotiation was 
to be 'in good faith'. The negotiations must be meaningfuJlOO_ 
Conformity with international law: 
Delimitation is to be effected 'on the basis of international law' - as noted above. The view has 
been expressed that a treaty provision which merely provides that delimitation shall proceed on 
the basis of international law is superfluous1°1. In order to determine the meaning of this 
obligation it is necessary to first determine what the applicable rules of international law are. 
The reference to the Statute of the ICJ, Article 38, is quite meaningless and does not help to 
determine the applicable rules102. It simply means that such rules would be determined by 
generally recognised sources and forms of evidence of international law, which could include 
judicial decisions and negotiated agreementsto3. These guidelines are rather wide, and according 
to Ahnish 104, invite States to "solve their boundary disputes in accordance with this unwoven 
fabric of materials ... ". This, in fact, is "practically asking them to 'find' the law themselves". 
The Geneva Convention's formula in Article 6 is more restrictive, with its references to median or 
equidistance lines, and special circumstances, and is perhaps the more realistic approach. The 
LOSC formula is the converse of this, and has been considered to be a "dangerous lacuna" in 
the Convention's formula. As there are no substantive rules expressed in the provision, States will 
turn to judicial and arbitral decisions for clarification of the law. 
An Equitable Solution: 
More guidance is given by the qualification in Article 83(1) that "an equitable solution" must 
be achieved. 'Equitable solution' here does not infer that either the 'equidistance' or the 
'equitable principles'formula should be utilised. The reference is neutral in this regardI05. Thus, 
there was agreement without actually having to expressly refer to the median or equidistance line. 
The term 'equitable principles' was in fact changed to a vaguer formulationI06 and no further 
guidelines were given as to the distinction between 'equity' and 'equitable principles'. _ 
Unfortunately, this only serves to emphasise the vagueness already inherent in the concept of 
equity - that equity is a means by which to come to a solution and also the result to be achieved. 
Further help can be obtained only from court judgments. 
99 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) Judgment, ICJ Reports 1985, p.13 at p. 33 
100ibid 
101Ahnish, supra, at p. 79 
102see Brown, supra, p. 158 
103 According to Brown, ibid, this is obvious and would have been assumed anyway, had it not been mentioned 
104 Ahnish, supra, p. 79 
105 ibid 























ARTICLES 83(2) AND 83(3) 
These Articles provide interim measures pending agreement. Accordingly, "States concerned, in 
a spirit of understanding and co-operation, shall make every effort to enter into the provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardise or 
hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the 
final delimitation"101. 
COURT JUDGMENTS 
The Tunisia-Libya case and the Libya-Malta case will be examined .:, , _) extensively in the 
section entitled 'The Mediterranean Sea', infra. Settled agreements between Mediterranean States 
will also be examined. 
107 Article 83(3), Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982. If no agreement is reached within a reasonable period of 
time, the States concerned must submit the matter to conciliation under Part XV - provisions for compulsory 





























The Mediterranean Sea consists of a great expanse of waters, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean 
on the west to Asia on the east, separating Europe from Asia108- Its length is a little over 2 000 
nm,width - at its widest point - 600 nm, the area of which is divided between over eighteen 
sovereign states and three dependent territories. Their coasts vary widely in l~ngth, configuration 
and direction. 
As one would expect in enclosed or semi-enclosed seas - such as the Mediterranean - problems 
tend to arise in regards to the delimitation of maritime zones. States are located in fairly (or very) 
close proximity, and the situation is further complicated by the presence of numerous islands, 
. some independent, some not. In addition, three States - Spain, Italy and Greece - form extensive 
peninsulas which run into the sea and divide it. 
The purpose of this section is to analyse existing - and possible future continental shelf 
boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea. An examination will be made of five already settled 
boundaries, as well as two judgments; the Tunisia-Libya and Libya-Malta contintinental shelf 
cases (both mentioned above). 
*A brief summary will be made of events in the Aegean Sea,; the conflict between Greece and 
Turkey, with a view to suggesting a possible solution. 
SETTLED SHELF BOUNDARIES 
Maritime delimitation in the Mediterranean is complicated mainly by two factors: the existence 
of several islands and the difficulty in resolving boundary disputes bilaterally without affecting 
third States' interests. Most of the practice of States and cases adjudicated by the International 
Court is concerned with bilateral settlements and little guidance is available for three or four-party 
settlements. 
The settlements to be discussed are: 
The Italo-Yugoslav Agreement 
The Greco-Italian Agreement 
The Italo-Tunisia Agreement 
The Italo-Spanish Agreement 
























A possible French-Spanish boundary 
French-Italian negotiations 
French-Monacan Agreement 
The four Agreements concerning Italy contain a modification of the median line due to the 
special circumstances involving the presence of islands considered to be creative of inequity. The 
'equidistance-special circumstance' method of delimitation is used almost exclusively in State 
practice. 
THE ITALO-YUGOSLA V AGREEMENTI09 
This Agreement was signed in 1968 and came into force two years later, in 1970. The shelf 
boundary between the two States extends for 363 nm and comprises forty-three 'terminal points', 
separated by an average distance of just over 8 nm 11 o. The northern terminal point of the 
boundary is joined to the territorial sea boundary 111 and the southern terminal point corresponds 
roughly with the border between Albania and Yugoslavia112. 
The Italian-Yugoslav boundary is an equidistant line between the mainland of Italy and the larger 
islands close to the Yugoslav coast, except between two points on the line where there is a 
deviation in order to compensate Italy for the influence of the several islands off the Yugoslav 
coast some of which are located well into the Adriatic Sea, such as Jabuka, Kajula and Pelagruz. 
One of these islands, Jabuka, was used as a basepoint, although the effect of this was diminished 
by the fact that the notional median line was shifted eastwards, giving Italy an area of 1 680 sq. 
km. The islet of Busi was given no effect, but a larger islet, Lissa, was given full effect! 13 . 
In the south, Italy obtained a further 1 400 sq. km because the furthermost Yugoslav islands were 
given no effect. Each island was given a semi-enclave of 12 nm. However, this was compensated 
by giving the island of Pianosa no effect, thereby conceding an area of 416 sq. km. to 
Yugoslavia. The Tremiti islands were also given no effect. 
A special provision was included on natural deposits straddling the boundary. The parties agreed 
to proceed, in the interim period, by mutual Agreement114. 
109 Ahnish, supra, p. 299 
110 ibid, p. 297 
111 This is in accordance with the Treaty of Osiino, 1975, between the two parties 
112 Ahnish, supra, p. 297 
113 Ahnish. supra, p. 297 - 298 






















THE GRECO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT115 
The Agreement was concluded in 1977, entering into force at the end of 1980. The Greek-Italian 
border runs in a north-south direction for 268 nm. Under the Agreement the line can eventually 
be extended Northwards and Southwards until it meets the continental shelves of neighbouring 
Statesl 16. Under Article 1, a median line was used to determine the border, taking into 
consideration any mutually approved minor adjustmentsll7. Such mutually approved adjustments 
were made at two points, where the boundary line falls nearer to the Gr~ek coast. The reasoning 
behind this is probably to offset the effect of the inclusion of fringing Greek islands, in contrast 
to Italy, whose coast has virtually no islands. Greece made a further concession by accepting the 
Italian enclosure of the Gulf of Taranto. Two of the turning points are equidistant from the 
Italian baselines which enclose the Gulfs entrance points at Cape S. Maria di Leuca and Cape 
Colona11s. However, at one point the line is 6.1 nm closer to Italy than to the Greek island of 
Kefallinial 19 . 
THE ITALO-TUNISIAN AGREEMENT120 
This agreement was signed in 1971 and came into force in 1978. There are thirty four terminal 
and turning points on the boundary line which effectively delineates the two shelves between 
Tunisia:i; and Sardinia and Sicily (Italian islands). line's length is 443.36 nm in tota}l21. It 
consists of' a median line, every point of .which is equidistant from the nearest points of the 
baselines from which the breadths of the Italian and Tunisian territorial seas are measured, taking 
into account islets and 'low-tide elevations with exception of Lampione, Lampedusa, Linosa and 
Pantelleria'122. 
Pantelleria, Linosa , Lampione and Lampedusa 
The islands of Pantelleria and Linosa, close to the notional median line, are disregarded. 
Lampione and Lampedusa fall on the 'wrong side' of the line - approximately 60 and 69nm 
from the Tunisian coast respectively, and 115nm from Sicilly. Were a true median line to be 
drawn between these islands and the Tunisian coast, the boundary would be deflected to within 20 
to 33nm from the Tunisian mainland 123 . To avoid this distortion the parties agreed to give no 
effect to the four islands. Instead, the boundary line in the region of the islands diverges from 
equidistance, and follows the outer limits of the maritime zones drawn around each of the four 
islands. These maritime zones have been drawn as follows124 : Pantelleria, Lampedusa and 
115 ibid 
116 Art. 1 (3) of the Agreement, quoted by Ahnish, ibid, p. 300 






























Linosa have been given a 12nm territorial sea and a 1nm continental shelf by drawing a 13nm 
envelope of arcs which places them on Italy's side of the line. Lampione is the smallest of the 
three islands and has been granted a 12nm territorial sea but no continental shelf. 
Unlike the other Italian agreements the provisional nature of the boundary line is not expressly 
recognised, perhaps reflecting the parties' view that other neighbouring states - Malta a.nd Algeria 
- are not entitled to any claim within the terminal points of the boundary 125. In fact, Malta 
protested against the south-eastern extension of the boundary (up to point 32) as there is an 
overlap between the area claimed by Tunisia under the Italy-Tunisia Agreement and the area 
claimed by Malta under the combination of equidistance and the semi-enclave line around the 
Italian silands. Discussions between the two States ended in a deadlock126. 
THE ITALO-SPANISH AGREEMENTl27 
The continental shelf boundary lies between Sardinia and the Balearic island of Minorca under 
the Agreement of 1974 (entering into force in 1978). It is 137.19 nm in length, comprising ten 
turning and terminal pojnts128. The boundary has been established following the criterion of 
' ... equidistance from respective baselines' under Article 1 of the agreement129 . Although the 
parties have claimed straight baselines - Italy around Sardinia and Spain around Minorca - they 
have not been used to determine the equidistant line. Instead, a concave, 'equidistanc4e' line has 
been established, taking account of the concave west coast of Sardinia (as it is the larger island)130 
There are two potential conflicts. If the equidistance line is utilised the boundary line will extend 
5 miles northwards where is will meet with a French maritime zone. A potential Algerian zone 
will be encountered about 8 miles south of the terminal point. It is unlikety that problems will 
arise with Algeria. France, on the other hand, does not tend to favour equidistance, so problems 
are foreseeable131 . 
The view France takes is that the delimitation of her continental shelf should not be decided on a 
strict application of equidistance because of the fact that the French coast is confined on all sides 
- from the east, south (Sardinia and the Balearics) and west - by Italy and Spain. Rather, the 
delimitation should take place according to 'equitable principles' 132. France in fact proposed 
the creation of a 'zone of economic interest', consisting of the overlapping continental shelves of 
the three States, France, Italy and Spain, in which there would be co-operation in the exploration 
125 ibid 
126 ibid 
12 7 ibid, p. 307 
128 ibid 
129 ibid 

























and exploitation of mineral resourcesl33 . 
Negotiaions between France and Spain 
Preliminary discussions between France and Spain took place in 1978, but no conclusion was 
reached134 . 
Both States are parties to the Geneva Convention, 1958. France has entered a reservation to 
Article 6 stating that in the absence of an express agreement France will not accept any 
continental shelf boundary determined on the equidistance principle invoked against it if it 
extends beyond that 20O-metre isobath135 . Most of the continental shelf area off the French-
Spanish coasts extends beyond this. In practice, however, France does not appear to renounce the 
reservation, The French Government has determined the extension of its continental shelf by 
reference only to the distance criterion of 200nm, with no mention of depth136 . Ahnish submits 
that the reservation is no longer significant because it was motivated by opposition in 1958 to the 
exploitability criterion included in Article 1137 . 
Therefore, the application of Article 6 would entail the identification of special circumstances as 
a result of the shape of Italy and Spain's coasts and the position of the Balearic Islands, opposite 
the coast of France. 
With regard to the shape of the States' coasts, the protrusion of the Spanish coast at Cape Creus 
causes concavity in the French coast which is emphasised by the fact that the coast then runs in a 
slightly north-easterly direction. This concavity would cause France to be disadvantaged were 
equidistance to be strictly applied. Thus, a modified equidistant boundary could be achieved by 
giving the peninsula at Cape Creus half-effectI38 . 
Whether or not such a boundary could be extended beyond the 12nm territorial sea depends 
largely on the boundary drawn for the opposite coasts of France and the Balearic Islands. France 
would probably argue here that these islands should not be given full effect as this would prevent 
the extension of the French continental shelf southwards. However, this is unreasonable because 
although the Balearic Islands are opposite the mainland of France and the island of Corsica, they 
cannot be regarded as falling on the 'wrong side\of the 'median/equidistance line, and are actually 
much closer to the Spanish coast than to the French coasts139 . Ahnish suggests that France may 
be compensated by giving full effect to the islands of Hyeres, in the French territorial sea, 
opposite Minorca140 . 
133 ibid 
134 ibid, p. 310 
135 ibid, p, 310 
136 ibid. Refers to Art 2 Law No, 76-655 of 1976 
137 ibid 
138 ibid 
























Negotiations between France and Italy 
Delimitation of the continental shelf between these two States is complicated by the presence of 
islands; Corsica and Sardinia are fairly large islands lying off their coasts, and further smaller 
islands lie off the coast fo Tuscany preventing the application of a simple equidistance line. 
The continental shelf north and east of Corsica which consists of a relatively shallow plateau 
joining the island to the mainland. This area is not accessible from the west coasts of Sardinia and 
Corsica. 
Negotiations for delimitation ,of the territorial sea and continental shelf in this area reportedly 
took place between the two States between 1972 and 1974. These negotiations resulted jn an 
agreement ad referendum on a draft convention14I , which established an equidistant line -
adjusted in the Gulf of Genoa and the Tyrrhenian Sea, east of Corsica, and in the Bocche de 
Bonifacio. The line gave effect to almost all islands, with the exception of some very small 
islands142 . 
The defining of the median line proper in the Bocche de Bonifacio took place in 1986143 . 
However, there was no consensus with regards to the rest of the area. Thus no agreement could be· 
reached. 
"The Italian delegation reserved its position as to the exact placing by France of the turning-
points in the Cote d'Azur/Riviera, Bocche de Bonifacio, and as to the exchange of total areas 
in the Gulf of Genoa. The French delegation ... reserved its position on the Italian plan at the 
time to establish straight baselines around, inter alia, the Tuscan archipelago"I44 
. .., 
At this point France evoked the reservation over Article 6 that, without a specific agreement, 
France would not accept a continental shelf boundary on the basis of equidistance and by 
reference to straight baselines established after 29 April 1958. The two parties then agreed that 
they would consider establishing specific 'baselines' on land for delimitation purposes145 . 
With regard to the area west of Corsica and Sardinia the parties were unable to come to any 
agreement as to the appropriate method of delimitation. This could be due to the fact that the 
area may contain oiJI46 and France is aware that Sardinia - which extends further west than 
Corsica - is situated adjacent to Corsica and opposite the coast of continental France, thereby 
preventing the full extension of France's continental shelf southwards. 
Thus, when Italy suggested an equidistant line be drawn, taking into account the existing Italian-
Spanish boundary line, France rejected this, proposing instead the creation of a joint 'zone of 
economic interest' between them, as mentioned above. 
141 ibid, 'Compendium of Negotiations between Italy and France on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf', 
meeting of 25 - 26 February 1974, unpublished document 



























THE FRENCH-MONACAN AGREEMENT 
The Agreement took place in 1984, entering into force in 1985147 .This agreement is worth 
mentioning because it provides for the first single maritime boundary to be established in the 
Mediterranean Seal48 . 
























THE TUNISIA-LIBYA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASE {1982)149 
In this case neither State was a party to the Geneva Convention. Ideally, the case should have 
been an "important landmark in the development and clarification of the rules governing 
delimitation of the continental shelf between neighbouring states"I50, had the Court taken the 
opportunity to review its findings in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969). At the time, 
UNCLOS III was in its final stages , and clarification of the law would have been appropriate, 
particularly regarding customary international law and taking into account subsequent 
developments which had occurred in the intervening period. Unfortunately, any such expectations 
were to be disappointed. In fact, the judgment could be considered a distinct step backwards 
compared to the decision of the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf 
case 151. 
The Court was asked to decide the following: 
What principles and rules of international law may be applied for the delimitation of the area 
of the continental shelf appertaining to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and to 
the area of the continental shelf appertaining to the Republic of Tunisia, and the Court shall 
take its decision according to equitable principles, and the relevant circumstances which 
characterize the area, as well as the new accepted trends in the Third Conference on the Law 
of the Sea. 
The Court was also asked to "clarify the practical method for the application of these principles 
and rules in this specific situation, so as to enable the experts of the two countries to delimit these 
areas without any difficulties"152. 
The Court felt that no particular method of delimitation was obligatory, including equidistance 
(this echoed earlier decisions), and that a variety of methods could be applied to the same 
delimitation153 . Although willing to consider the law under Article 83 of the new Convention, the 
Court noted that the Article lacked "any indication of a specific criterion which would give 
guidance to the interested States in their effort to achieve an equitable solution"I54 . Rather, it 
emphasised the need to achieve an equitable solution 155 . Thus, both parties and the Court agreed 
that the delimitation was to be carried out in accordance with 'equitable principles', taking into 
consideration the relevant circumstances which characterised the area. 
The following principles were considered. 
Natural Prolongation: 
149 The Continental, Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, !CJ Reports 1982 
150 E.D. Brown, The Tunisia-Libya Continental, Shelf case: A missed Opportunity, 7 MP (1983) p. 142 
151 Brown, supra, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. 1, 1994, p. 179 
152 Judgment, supra, para 4. Quoted by Ahnish, supra, p. 315 
153 Judgment, supra, para 109 - 111 
























In its judgment in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case the court, while still considering the 
doctrine of natural prolongation to be important - particularly in relation to relevant 
circumstances from the point of view of equity - had rejected the doctrine as a basis for 
delimitation of the continental shelfl56. 
In this case the two parties put forward different contentions as to the geological and 
geomorphological formation of certain features in order to support their arguments. The area of 
the continental shelf subject to the delimitation was part of a region know as the Pelagian Block. 
Libya contended that the area off its coast, constituting the Pelagian Block, was the natural 
prolongation northward of the North African land mass to the south, in as far as it constituted a 
typical continental margin produced by plate movement and rifting, explained by the theory of 
'plate tectonics' 157 . Thus, Libya submitted, the appropriate method of delimitation " ... is to 
reflect the direction of this prolongation northward of the terminal point of the land 
boundary"158. 
Tunisia argued that the Pelagian Block was the geological and geomorphological continuation of 
the land territory of Tunisia, because they were both aligned generally in an east-west directiont59_ 
Tunisia's intention was to establish that "the natural prolongation of its territory extended 
eastwards as far as the area between the 250 - 300 metre isobath, and south-eastwards as far as 
the zone constituted by the Zira and Zuwarah Ridges"160. 
However, the Court held that the satisfaction of equitable principles was of foremost importance, 
and that the two considerations of satisfying equitable principles and identifying natural 
prolongation "are not to be placed on a plane of equality"161. 
The Court stated that "in the present case, no criterion for the delimitation of shelf areas can be 
derived from the principle of natural prolongation as such"l62 . The reason for this was that 
"Libya and Tunisia both derive continental shelf title from a natural prolongation common to 
both territories", thus, "the ascertainment of the extent of the areas of shelf appertaining to eac.h 
State must be governed by criteria of international law other than those taken from physical 
features" 163. 
Although the rejection of the doctrine of natural prolongation only applies to the physical 
circumstances of this case, the circumstances are not so dissimilar to those occurring off the coasts 
of othe~ States that the rejection will be an isolated event. Thus, rather than being a basis of 
delimitation, natural prolongation should be considered to be a special circumstance. 
156 Brown, supra, MP, p. 146 
157 Judgment, supra, para 52 
158 Ahnish, supra, p. 317 
159 ibid 
160 ibid 
161 Judgment, para 44 
162 ibid, p. 92 
























The judgment adds little to either clarifying judicial thinking on the matter or providing 
guidelines for applying such principles in negotiations. The meaning of 'equitable principles' 
is particularly important in the light of Article 83(1) of the Law of the Sea Convention, which 
requires that 'an equitable solution' be arrived at. Since the ICJ has emphasised the 'primordial 
importance' 164 of equitable principles in delimitation, it would not be unreasonable to expect a 
subsequent clarification of the scope and meaning of these principles. However, such clarification 
is not provided. 
Paragraphs 70 and 71165 contain an examination of the concept of equitable principles, although 
the propositions stated are somewhat general and abstract. This stated that "The equitableness of 
a principle must be assessed in the light of its usefulness for the purpose of arriving at an 
equitable result" and "The term 'equitable principles' ... refers back to the principles and rules 
which may be appropriate in order to achieve an equitable result". No attempt is made to define 
'equitable result', which, it appears, would provide some sort of meaning to the term 'equitable 
principle'. 
Further, that "Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice" and "The 
legal concept of equity is a general principle directly applicable as law" is of little help in 
actually determining what equity means. 
Finally, the fact that equitable principles are distinguished from decisions ex aequo et bono is also 
not very helpful. The fact that a case is decided ex aequo et bono does not mean that the Court is 
freed from the strict application of legal rules in order to bring about an appropriate settlement, 
but rather that the Court may "depart from the law (whether strictly or equitably interpreted)" so 
that a fair result may be achieved, which it would not otherwise have been possible under the 
application of the law166. 
Relevant circumstances 
Although relevant circumstances will obviously depend on the circumstances of the particular 
case under discussion, the ICJ identified certain circumstances relevant in the determination of an 
equitable delimitation. They were identified as follows167: 
• geographical and geomorphological circumstances: 
164 Brown, supra, MP, p. 148 
165 Judgment, supra, p. 60 para 71 
166 Brown, supra, MP, p. 149 
the area relevant to the delimitation 
the general configuration of the coasts 
islands as relevant circumstances 
geomorphological configurations 






















• the existence and interests of other States in the area and the existing or potential 
delimitations between each of the parties and such States 
• the position of the intersection of the land frontier with the coastline 
• a number of alleged maritime limits resulting from the conduct of the States concerned 
• historic rights claimed 
• economic considerations 
In the Libya-Tunisia case, Tunisia's coast changes direction from an east-westerly direction at Ras 
Ajdir into a south-west, north-east direction as it extends further westward168 . This characteristic 
was considered to be 'largely significant' as a relevant circumstance characterising the area. 
Although it did not quite make the situation legally one of opposite States rather than adjacent 
ones, it did modify the situation of lateral adjacency of the two parties 169. 
The presence of islands was also considered to be a special circumstance. The Tunisian islands of 
Jerba and Kerkennah, and surrounding low-tide elevations were taken into consideration. 
However, regarding Jerba, although the island was relevant, other considerations prevailed over the 
effect of its presence, such as the existence and position of the Kerkennah Islands and 
surrounding low-tide elevationst7o. 
Also regarded as relevant was the land boundary terminus at Ras Ajdir, and the fact that the 
parties had in the past attempted to establish unilateral and bilateral partial maritime or adjoining 
concession boundary claims in the areas off Ras Ajdirl71. 
The 'historic claims' made by Tunisia were relevant not as an independent circumstance as 
Tunisia had argued, but rather , in relation to the principle of non-encroachment. In the 
circumstances of this case, the Court found that these historic rights claimed by Tunisia were not 
sufficient to affect the delimitation172. 
The practical method 
The Court stated that neither equidistance nor any other method of delimitation was obligatory. 
Further, several methods could be1 applied to the same delimitation 173. The starting point for any 
examination of methods, such as the examination of 'applicable principles and rules', must be the 
168 Ahnish, p. 320 
21 ibid 
170 Judgment, supra, para 79 
171 ibid, para 85 - 86 
Also, Ahnish, supra 
172 ibid, para 121 





















particular geographical circumstances of the case, and particularly "the extent and features of the 
area" to be delimited174 . 
If given full effect, the Kerkennah Islands would, in the circumstances of the case, be given 
'excessive weight'I75 . Thus, they were granted half-effect176. 
Although the Court considered what method of delimitation would ensure an equitable result, in 
Judge Oda's view, the line drawn by the Court did not "exemplify any principle or rule of 
international law" 111. 
Conclusion 
It is this case that Brown considers to be a 'missed opportunity'. The judgment has been 
criticised as lacking in legal principle, verging on an unauthorised determination ex aequo et 
bono, and' providing little guidance for the delimitation of maritime boundaries in other 
disputes178 . Having 'toned down' many of the dicta of the ICJ in the North Sea cases in the 
subsequent Anglo-French Continental Shelf arbitral decision, it appeared that substantial progress 
was being made in clarifying and developing this particular area of law179 . However, in the light 
of the need for guidelines to interpret Article 83(1) of the new Convention and the previous 
progress made, the case may be considered a 'regression' and a 'considerable disappointment'lSO 
. On a more positive note the Court did follow the Court of Arbitration's decision in the Anglo-
French case to a large extent with regard to natural prolongation. But this is "more than 
outweighed by the Judgment's many defects... failure to clarify the meaning of equitable 
principles and to keep in mind the need to distinguish clearly between the application of 
equitable principles and the rendering of a Judgment ex aequo et bono"181 • 
Feldman, however1s2, believes that the Court "took a significant step towards the formulation of 
integrated principles that can be applied ... "183 . It reconfirmed that equity does not entail a 
sharing out of shelf resources, it reconfirmed the principle that the 'land dominates the sea' 184 . 
Further, it was confirmed that a delimitation must not encroach on areas adjacent to the parties' 
coasts; that geology is not of major significant in maritime delimitation, and that a reasonable 
degree of proportionality must be effected between areas appertaining to the coastal States and to 
174 ibid, para 144 
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the length of their relevant coasts185 . 
In 1988 the parties agreed to implement the Court's decisionts6. 
THE LIBYA-MALTA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASE (1985hs1 
In this case the Court was asked to determine the principles and rules of international law to be 
applied to the delimitation the continental shelf between Libya and Malta, and to indicate how in 
practice such principles and rules could be applied by the parties so as to effect the delimitation 
by agreement without difficultyl88. 
The Libya-Malta case was the first to be decided by the ICJ since the adoption of the Law of the 
Sea Convention, 1982. However, the Convention was not yet in force, and Libya was not a party 
to the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958. Thus, strictly speaking, the case had to 
be decided on the basis of international customary law. However, the judgment clearly 
demonstrates that although the 1982 Convention was not yet in force, it was nonetheless of major 
importance in international law for law of the sea decisionst89: The Court, therefore, considered 
whether any provisions from the Convention would be binding on the parties as rules of 
international customary lawt90 . 
There were two complications in this case: firstly, an intervention by Italy and the Court's refusal 
to accept it; Secondly, Libya's reliance extensive on the principle of natural prolongation which 
it believed to be justified by the Court's assertion that "identification of natural prolongation 
may... have an important role to play in defining an equitable delimitation"191. 
As a result of Italy's attempt to intervene, the Court decided to limit its jurisdiction to an area in 
which third-state claims did not exist. This is rather paradoxical. It appears that having realised 
that it had no jurisdiction over the claims of a third State, the Court nevertheless decided to 
exclude areas of actual dispute between the parties, because of Italy's claimst92. In doing so it 
lost sight of the scope of the dispute between the two original partiest93 . This was the reason for 
Italy's request to intervene anyway, which the Court denied. 
Having identified the area of jurisdiction open to it, the Court endorsed its statement in the 
Tunisia-Libya case that delimitation should be based on equitable principles which would ensure 
an equitable result194. 
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For the first time the Court considered the concept of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and its 
effect on the rules for delimitation of the Continental ShelfI95 . It was observed that under the 
1982 Convention the same right enjoyed by a State over its continental shelf could also be 
asserted over the EEZ. This, the Court found, should be taken as a relevant circumstance for the 
delimitation of the continental shelf. However, it did not mean that "the concept of the 
continental shelf has been absorbed by that of the exclusive economic zone; it does however 
signify that greater importance must be attributed to elements, such as distance from the coast, 
which are common to both concepts"196 . These two concepts - those of the continental shelf and 
the EEZ - were considered to be "linked together in modern law"197 . The Court further stated 
that the distance criterion must now apply to the continental shelf and the EEZ, quite apart from 
the provision dealing with distance in paragraph 1, Article 76 (LOSC)198 . 
The Court's new view of the law has been summed up as followsI99 : 
• geological or geomorphological factors are irrelevant to the definition of, or basis of legal 
entitlement to, the continental shelf except where it extends more than 200 miles from the 
coast; 
• geological or geomorphological factors are irrelevant to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf between opposite States in cases where the distance between the States 
does not exceed 400 miles; 
• these propositions rest on rules of international customary law and do not rely for their 
validity on the UN Convention. 
The Court found that the distance between Malta and Libya was less than 400 miles and therefore 
geology or geomorphology was irrelevant, thus rejecting the argument that the 'rift zone' 
constituted a fundamental discontinuity "terminating the southward extension of the Maltese shelf 
and the northward extension of the Libyan shelf as if it were some natural boundary"zoo . 
Principle issues considered were as follows. 
The Doctrine of Natural Prolongation 
The Court found that the distance criterion was to apply to the continental shelf as well as the 
195 Brown, supra, p. 192 
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EEZ. However, it was emphasised that the idea of natural prolongation "had not been 
superseded by that of distance"201 . Rather, in a situation where the continental margin was less 
than 200 miles from the coast, natural prolongation is partially defined by distance from the 
shore, regardless of the physical nature of the intervening sea-bed and subsoil. In other words, 
the two concepts of natural prolongation and distance are not opposed but complimentary202. 
Unfortunately, how natural prolongation could be partially defined by distance from the shore, 
and in what way these two concepts could be considered complementary, was not explained. 
Judge Oda, concerning the above statement by the Court, said that it "is surely, at least within the 
20O-mile context, no more than a method of keeping 'natural prolongation' alive by artificial 
respiration"203 . It has been submitted that it would have been more acceptable for the Court to 
simply reiterate the reasonable view that the development of the law since the 1977 Anglo-French 
Award has progressively indicated the relative demise of the concept of natural prolongation, at 
least within the 4OO-mile distance204. 
Thus, it was the Court's opinion that an equitable result was achieved by tracing the median line 
between the opposite coasts of the two parties, "by way of a provisional step in a process to be 
continued by other operations"205 
Eguidistance 
Equidistance is to be applied to a delimitation as a first stage of the process. But the results of this 
'first stage' are reversible, and cannot be supported solely by evoking numerous examples of 
delimitations using equidistance or modified equidistance206 . However, the Court felt that there 
was impressive evidence to support the fact that equidistance could produce an equitable result in 
a wide variety of situations207 . 
Relevant circumstances 
The equity of the provisional line was examined in light of relevant circumstances. The Court 
decided that Malta's straight baseline system - which connected, inter alia, the island of Malta to 
the Rock of Fil fl a (uninhabited) - should be disregarded. By ignoring Fil fl a "the 
disproportionate effect of certain islets, rocks and minor coastal projections" could be 
eliminated208 . 
Two further relevant circumstances were the disparity in lengths of the coastlines of the two 
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parties and the macrogeographical position of Malta in the mid-Mediterranean209 . The Court 
found that the former circumstance justified the adjusting of the median line northwards in order 
to give Libya a larger area of continental shelf2I0 . This circumstance was not to be confused with 
the use of the same factor in assessing ratios of proportionality21 J: this was a significant 
development in the case-law which had formerly examined the disparity in coastal lengths within 
the context of proportionality212. How far northwards the median line should be moved was to 
be decided in a wider geographical context. 
The geographical location of the Maltese islands - located in the northern seaboard of the 
Mediterranean - was considered to be a relevant circumstance, particularly relevant with regard to 
the matter of adjusting the median line213 . 
The final result entailed moving the line north by three quarters of the distance between the 
original median line between Malta and Libya and the median line between Sicily and Libya214, 
which achieved an equitable result in all the circumstances, according to the Court. 
Conclusion 
The judgment is significant for several reasons: it deals with the impact of the concept of the EEZ 
on continental shelf delimitation, considered for the first time by a court; it clarifies the fact that 
geological or geomorphological factors are irrelevant to delimitation between opposite States in 
circumstances when the distance between them is 400 miles or less; it at least acknowledges the 
impressive evidence that the equidistance method can frequently yield an equitable result; and it 
confirms the important role of equitable principles in maritime delimitation215 . 
It is unfortunate that the Court was so reluctant to discard the idea of natural prolongation. Its 
retention of it as "more and more a complex juridical concept... in part defined by distance from 
the shore, irrespective of the physical nature of the intervening sea-bed and subsoil ... is distinctly 
unnatural"2I6. 
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THE AEGEAN SEA 
CONTINENTAL SHELF DISPUTE 
IV 
INTRODUCTION 
The Aegean Sea is an arm of the Mediterranean Sea. It is connected through the straits of the 
Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosporous with the Black Sea2t 7 and is encircled by the 
Cretan islands in the south, the coast of Turkey in the east, and the mainland of Greece in the west 
and north218 . 
The Dispute 
In November, 1973, the Turkish government published a map in the Turkish Government Gazette 
which designated areas of the Aegean - including Greek areas - for exploration purposes, and 
issued exploration concessions to the Turkish Petroleum Company219 . 
The friction was heightened when, in 1974 and 1976, Turkish Oceanographic research vessels 
entered the Aegean to carry out research activities in what Turkey claimed to be the "Turkish 
continental shel/'220 . 
In March, 1987, Turkey once again planned to conduct seismic surveys in an area under dispute. 
The plan was called off in an effort to ease the tension between the two States221 
Greece first began granting oil concessions in the Aegean in the early 1960s222 . However, 
Greece has not actually published concession areas "coinciding with its claims in the Aegean" -
unlike Turkey. Thus, Greece's practice does not reflect her view on the continental shelf 
boundary with Turkey223 
In August, 1976, the Greek Government instituted proceedings against the Government of Turkey 
in the ICJ. The isssue in question was a despute over the delimitation of the continental shelf in 
the Aegean Sea and a declaration of the rights of parties in the region224 . On the same day 
Greece also filed a request for interim measures of protection requesting that the Court instruct 
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Greece and Turkey to refrain from certain activities22s in the continental shelf areas in dispute in 
the present case, unless with the consent of each other and pending the final judgment of tlie 
Court in this case, and to refrain from taking further military measures or actions which could 
threaten peace226 . Greece also addressed the Security Council regarding the matter, claiming that 
a dangerous situation had arisen concerning Turkey's recent actions in the continental shelf of 
the Aegean, which was a threat to peace and security227 . Turkey's reply to the ICJ was that the 
Court lacked the necessary jurisdiction over the application. In fact, the Court held that it did not 
have jurisdiction over the dipute228 . 
PRINCIPLES OF DELIMITATION 
Turkey 
Turkey is not a party to the Geneva Convention, nor to LOSC. It did, however, strongly support 
the concept of 'equitable principles' in the UNCLOS III proceedings. Turkey was of the belief 
that the entire Aegean Sea constituted an example of a 'special circumstance', and should be 
treated as such when applying the rules of international law. The Turkish delegation also felt that 
islands, islets and rocks in the area of the Aegean should be taken into consideration, as they 
could have a distorting effect on the EEZ229 . 
Greece 
Greece is a party to the Geneva Convention. Therefore, any claims are based on the Convention. 
In its Note verbale (1974) Greece stressed these points: that territorial sovereignty over the Greek 
islands extended to Greece's sea-bed and subsoil as well as the continental shelf, according to 
international law; and that the delimitation of the shelf is based on the theory and practice of 
international law on the principle of equidistance, according to Article 6(1) of the Geneva 
Convention230 . In its proceeding against Turkey23I, Greece's intention was "to deny Turkey any 
seabed area beyond the coasts of the Aegean islands situated off the coast of Anatolia"232 . 
Greece supports the rights of islands to a continental shelf, and cites the Geneva Convention, 
LOSC and the North Sea cases233 . At UNCLOS III Greece supported the equal treatment of 
islands and islets with regards to continental shelf entitlement. However, in its draft articles Greece 
suggested that the phrase 'special circumstances' be deleted from the text. The reason for this 
was Greece's belief that "no State is entitled to extend its sovereignty beyond the median line 
225 Such as exploration activity and scientific research. See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Interim Protection, Order 
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every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines, continental or insular, 
from which the continental shelf of each of the two States is measured"234 . Thus,' it is with regard 
to the principles of law to be applied in the Aegean that the two States are in conflict. 
Political Factors 
However, there are also influences of a political nature regarding oil resources, access in the 
eastern Aegean to and from the Dardanelles and the major ports of Anatolia, and- air traffic235 . 
, Turkey has felt that certain legal regimes such as innocent passage and freedom of navigation, 
and overflight in the high seas could be threatened in times of crisis with Greece236 . 
Greece, on the other hand, views Turkey's equidistant line in the middle of the Aegean as an 
attempt by Turkey to "restructure the political frontier decided in the 1923 and 1947 
Agreements"231. Further, Greece naturally sees any attempt to cut off continuity between Greek-
owned islands and mainland Greece as a threat to the "national integrity" of the islands238 . 
CONCLUSION 
Greece has been critical of Turkey's refusal to submit her claims to the judgment of the Court239. 
However, as can be seen, the issue is largely political. Thus, political security is an essential factor 
in each of the parties legal stand-points240 .This factor would have to be considered in a resulting 
delimitation. The dispute cannot be settled until political differences are solved. 
With regard to the law on delimitation. generally 
That this field of law is vague cannot be denied. It is true that a body of law dealing with such a 
wide variety of circumstances needs a degree of flexibility to be applied to all situations. 
However, there is a danger that such flexibility is creates too much uncertainty. Certainly, having 
examined a variety of cases, it appears that different courts and tribunals attach varying 
definitions to the principles and rules of law applicable to delimitation. 
Although case law recently has created more certainty in the law than before,, for example in 
clarifying the role of natural prolongation, the situation is not yet ideal. As has been seen above, 
the Tunisia-Libya case was considered to be a disapointment, In the more recent Greenland-Jan 
Mayen maritime delimitation case (1993)241, Vice-President Oda stated that the line drawn did not 
appear "to be founded on any justifiable reasoning". Each time the Court (or arbitration) 
departs from previous practice it takes a step further away from clarifying the law on delimitation. 
There is still a significant amount of progress to be made 
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